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Abstract
We propose a model of the phenomenon of persuasion. We argue that individual beliefs
evolve in a way that overweights the opinions and information of individuals whom they
\listen to" relative to other individuals. Such agents can be understood to be acting as
though they believe they listen to a representative sample of the individuals with valuable
information, even though they may not. We analyze dynamics and convergence of beliefs,
characterizing when agents' beliefs converge over time to the same beliefs, and when they
instead diverge. Convergent beliefs can be characterized as the weighted averageof agents'
initial beliefs, and these weights can be interpreted as a measure of \in°uence." We then
explore implications in an asset trading setting. Here we demonstrate that agents pro¯t
from being in°uential as well as being accurate. When agents' choice of whom to listen
to is endogenous, we show that an individual's in°uence can be persistent, even though
the individual may be inaccurate.
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It is well knownthatina fully rational model, the beliefs of individuals mustfollow martingales.1
An individual who anticipates a future change in her expected beliefs should incorporate this
into beliefs immediately. Nonetheless, there seems to be a wide variety of settings where
individuals' beliefs change in ex-ante predictable manners. Individuals frequently appear to
believe statements such as: \If I associate with a certain group, I am likely to agree more
with their beliefs"; \If I choose to attend school A, I will likely develop an `A-school' style of
thought"; and, \as I age, I am likely to become more conservative".
More generally, in a wide range of settings, the activity of persuasion appears to a®ect
listeners' beliefs in a predictable manner, towards the direction of the persuader. Whether
it is a speaker giving a lecture, an attorney arguing for a client, or a newspaper editorial,
common observation suggests that, on average, such arguments are more likely to convince
than to dissuade. In a fully rational model, however, once someone states their position, there
should be, on average, no scope for persuasion, provided that the listener has an unbiased
assessment of the accuracy of the persuader's views. Attempts at persuasion are just as likely
to drive an opinion away from the persuader as towards her.
Of course, the fact that a persuader can a®ect a listener's opinion, by presenting unex-
pectedly good evidence for his viewpoint, is not itself a violation of rationality. Even if the
listener has an unbiased assessment of how strong the persuader's evidence is likely to be,
if the persuader has a \good draw" of convincing evidence, one would expect his arguments
to have an in°uence. Thus, for example, if a persuader is better informed than expected,
the persuader may be able to anticipate his information will move other's views towards his
own. And in settings where it is in his interest for others to have similar opinions { be it
for political, social, or market reasons { he will have an incentive to engage in persuasion.
With full rationality, such activity would only be bene¯cial when one's information is better
than expected. Nonetheless, if the lack of such activity was taken as a signal of low quality
information, there could exist a standard fully revealing signaling equilibrium where every-
one chooses to persuade, even though such activity on average has no e®ect, lest individuals
otherwise infer that one's silence signals information of a very poor quality.
Such an explanation, however, seems to fall short of explaining much persuasive activity.
While it may be true that one side of an argument { that with the better case than anticipated
{ would bene¯t from persuasive activity, often both sides appear to be e®ective in their
persuasion. That is, both sides seem to a®ect in their favor the opinions of those with whom
1See for example, Bray and Kreps (1987).
1they interact. For example, under complete rationality, the moderate reader of the liberal
newspaper should be just as likely to reject the views he reads as to adopt them. He should
realize that, even if he is not reading the conservative newspaper, it is likely to have an
opposing position, that he, as a moderate, is likely to ¯nd equally compelling. But to the
contrary, observation suggests that such a moderate reader is in expectation likely to become
more liberal if she regularly reads the liberal newspaper, while a similar moderate reader of
a conservative newspaper is more likely to adopt his paper's conservative views.2 Likewise,
it is hard to believe that activities such as going to college, joining the military, working
in a profession, etc..., do not systematically a®ect the average individual's beliefs on many
issues in predictable manners. In general, individuals' views typically seem to evolve towards
standard views of groups with which they regularly interact.
Similarly, the notion that persuasive activity makes a listener more sympathetic to an idea,
independent of its merits, seems to underlie motivations for censorship and propaganda. If I
believe my views are correct and someone else's are wrong { or even harmful, why shouldn't
I a®ord my opponent every opportunity to speak, since this should in expectation serve to
convince the listener that they had overrated this opposing view? In contrast, however,
underlying the impulse to censor is clearly the notion that when individuals propound these
views, they will be more likely to convince listeners than to dissuade them. Likewise, the
use of propaganda seems based on the notion that repeated exposures to a view are likely to
a®ect beliefs in a predictable manner. Such a view certainly seems to underlie much marketing
activity. Along similar lines, a debate without equal time for each side, or a criminal trial
where the defense was not allowed to present their case would generally be considered unfair.
Yet if it was understood that such rules were imposed exogenously, they should not a®ect the
average outcome in a setting where beliefs follow martingales. After hearing the prosecution,
the jury should have a belief about the merits of the defendant's case, which is no more likely
to be strengthened than weakened by hearing the defense.3 In practice, however, such notions
seem counterfactual. Rival viewpoints generally ¯ght for \airtime," political spending does
in°uence campaign outcomes, and attorneys do sway juries with their arguments.
What all these examples have in common is the notion that repeated exposure to an
2It is of course, not surprising that liberals and conservatives may choose to read newspapers similar to
their political view { if for no other reason than they infer their respective newspaper will be more accurate.
However, this does not explain why newspapers with opposite positions simultaneously move their respective
readers' opinions in opposite directions.
3In fact, if the criterion for conviction is that the jury's posterior assessment of guilt lies in an exogenously
determined lower tail of the distribution (\beyond a shadow of a doubt"), then hearing the defendant's case
will raise the probability of conviction. This follows from noting that any new information leads to a mean-
preserving spread of the assessment of guilt, raising the likelihood of a tail event.
2opinion is likely to a®ect individuals' beliefs. If I explain the basis for my opinion to you, on
average, you are more likely to adjust your opinion towards mine than away from it. And
interacting regularly with a homogenous crowd is likely to lead one to move in the direction
of this crowd's views. Evidence for such a salience bias is pervasive in the psychological
literature.4 One simple explanation for persuasive e®ects is that individuals give too much
weight to the views that they hear relative to the ones they don't hear. Agents may simply
not understand the full structure of their environment, and consequently may believe that
those to whom they listen comprise a more representative sample of beliefs than in fact is
the case. Intuitively, agents may not realize the extent to which the crowds in which they
associate and the assumptions made by peers are not representative.5
As an introduction to the model of persuasion we will develop, consider the following
extremely simple environment. Suppose the uncertain parameter that individuals are forming
opinions about relates to the probability of heads from a particular type of coin. Individual
i may choose to gather information by conducting some number of trials, ni, and observing
the frequency of heads, xi.
Suppose next that individuals i and j meet. They each have di®erent information, xi
and xj, and thus will in general have di®erent opinions. Individual j may try to \persuade"
individual i by revealing his information. If individual i \listens to" individual j, then an








We will analyze updating rules of this form, and in fact show that if individuals do listen
to representative samples from the entire population, such an updating rule will lead to the
correct ultimate posterior beliefs.
On the other hand, note that if i and j's current information depends upon previous
interactions with others, this updating rule is not necessarily Bayesian in the sense that there
is no attempt to adjust for potential over-sampling of certain information. For instance, if i
and j both previously listened to individual k, then the updating rule above will e®ectively
\double count" this information. In such a circumstance, individual k's beliefs will have
undue in°uence on the beliefs of individuals i and j.
4See, for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1973). Nisbett and Ross (1980) and Fiske and Taylor (1984)
provide a review of this literature. Also closely related is the notion of con¯rmatory bias, whereby individuals
interpret the evidence they observe in accord with their prior beliefs. See for example Lord, Ross and Lepper
(1979). Rabin (1998) provides both an overview, and a discussion of applications in economic contexts.
5For an early discussion of this possibility in the psychology literature, see Ross, Greene and House (1977).
3It is in this sense that we attempt to model the phenomenon of persuasion. We assume
that individuals use a heuristic updating rule such as (1) above, without properly adjusting
for the fact that the sample of individuals whom they listen to may be non-representative of
the population as a whole. Thus, repeated sampling of information from the same individual
or group of individuals will result in that individual or group having in°uence over the beliefs
of others. In the context of the examples described above, listening repeatedly to like-minded
colleagues or the same conservative authors (or individuals who read those authors) will tend
to sway one's opinions towards that group.
Thus, persuasion bias in our model results from the fact that not all individuals com-
municate with a representative sample of the population, and that they do not adjust for
this in their updating rule. While this is not fully rational, we claim it is \near-rational" in
the sense that this updating rule leads to correct information aggregation under the simpler
model of the world that samples are representative. Moreover, it seems to ¯t well with av-
erage behavior. For example, when listening to the opinions of others, most individuals do
not appear to put less weight on the opinions of those who read the same newspaper as they
do { though they should since otherwise that common component of the information will be
over-represented.
Again, one justi¯cation for our model is that individuals believe they communicate with
a random sample of the population when they do not. An alternative interpretation of
our updating rule is that individuals believe that only a subset of the population possesses
useful information worth listening to, and that the beliefs of the remainder of the population
consist of useless noise. Thus, even though individuals may realize that they do not listen
to a representative sample of the entire population, they may believe that they listen to a
representative sample of the \right" people. For example, the economist might dismiss out
of hand the market analyst who begins his argument with chartist notions, while the chartist
might in turn dismiss the views of anyone subscribing to \crazy" academic notions of market
e±ciency. Insofar as all individuals' assessment of who does not possess useful information
is not completely correct, our persuasion bias will follow. In this case, individuals know that
the individuals that they listen to do not correspond to a representative sample, yet this is
justi¯ed given their model of the world.
We take such a \persuasion bias" as a primitive in our model, and examine its implications
for the dynamics of beliefs in general and an asset trading market in particular. In Section 2
of the paper, we develop a formal model of this environment, and show that if all individuals
listen to unbiased samples of individuals from the entire population, then information is cor-
rectly aggregated. If, however, there are biases in the patterns of communication, information
4will be aggregated in a way which gives the information held by certain groups of individuals
more weight than that held by others. In particular, we characterize the dynamics of beliefs
in the population, and show that under a simple condition on the pattern of communication,
beliefs of all agents converge to the same beliefs, given by a weighted average of initial be-
liefs. The weight associated with any type, in turn, can readily be interpreted as that type's
\in°uence," and will be seen to depend on both the number and the in°uence of the types
who listen to this given type.
In Section 3, we incorporate our model of persuasion into a model of asset markets.
Standard models of asset markets generate trading volume through risk-sharing and liquidity
motives, generally induced by the presence of noise traders. In actuality, however, much
trading volume seems to be generated because agents believe that they can process the same,
public information better than others. We model this by assuming agents believe that only a
subset of the population possesses useful information worth listening to, and that the beliefs
of the remainder of the population consist of useless noise.6 That is, agents believe that they
are better than others in identifying the useful information in the population.
In our asset market model, agents listen to the information of others, update their beliefs,
and then trade on their updated beliefs. We demonstrate that in this setting, there is not only
a role for using information accurately, but also a role for in°uence. Intuitively, in°uential
agents may be able to persuade others of their beliefs, and in the process a®ect price dynamics
in a manner that bene¯ts them, even if their information is not particularly accurate.
One obvious question that this suggests is whether others will listen to such a poorly
informed but in°uential agent in the future. That is, if we repeat such a game and allow
agents to choose whom to listen to based on some measure of past performance, will they
choose to keep listening to such an agent? We take up this question at the end of Section
3. We show that in°uence can be self-perpetuating. In particular, it can be in the interest
of agents to listen to agents who are in°uential, even if they are inaccurate. Furthermore,
in°uence can generally lead to higher pro¯ts. We characterize in settings in which in°uence
can be \stable," in a manner to be de¯ned.
A number of literatures are relevant to this paper. Most closely related, some of the
fundamental elements of our general model of persuasion have been previously analyzed,
though under a signi¯cantly di®erent context, motivation and interpretation. In particular,
French (1956) and Harary (1959) consider a setup similar to our abstract model in Section 2,
6Hence, while there are no actual noise traders in the model, the fact that each agent believes there are is
su±cient to generate trade.
5to examine \social in°uence." Thus, our Theorem 2 is generalization of the results of Harary.7
And whereas neither French or Harary recognize the characterization for the convergent
point in beliefs that we ¯nd in Theorem 3, this result follows from a combination of their
Theorems with the characterizations of a stationary distribution of a Markov chain in Freidlin
and Wentzell (1984), applied to the speci¯c case of our model. We depart from French
and Harary in motivating the problem as one of persuasion, in our ability to characterize
in°uence in accord with the graphical structure of who listens to whom, in developing a
setting under which the mechanics of beliefs follow from the behavior of near-rational agents,
and in thinking about the implications of such a setting in a ¯nance market with maximizing
agents.
The paper whose motivation is perhaps most similar to our ¯nance application is Harris
and Raviv (1993). Like us, they also consider a setting where investors employ di®erent
models to interpret the same public information, and are willing to trade because they believe
they have a superior model.8 We di®er from this work in that we explicitly model the nature of
traders' di®erent models of the world, and consequently how information will be di®erentially
interpreted. More speci¯cally, our agents' have models of the world which yield an important
role for communication and updating of beliefs. Agents in our setting do understand that
alternative interpretations of public information made by other traders is of value. This focus
on the communication structure allows us to derive implications for the role of \in°uence"
and to explore naturally the possibility of traders altering their models. In contrast, Harris
and Raviv and other similar papers are instead primarily concerned with a very di®erent set
of issues relating to the cross-sectional and time-series relationship between price and volume.
A number of recent papers consider the implications for ¯nancial markets of biases in
traders' inference processes. One particular manifestation, common to Daniel, Hirshleifer
and Subrahmanyam (1998), Gervais and Odean (1997) and Benos (1996), considers traders
who are overcon¯dent in their assessment of their information. These papers are similar to
ours in considering the consequences of psychologically motivated biases for asset markets.
They di®er in that traders make mistakes directly about the value of relevant information,
and there is no role for communication. In contrast, in our setting, traders understand their
7Additionally, DeGroot (1974) examines a model virtually identical to that of French and Harary. Neither
DeGroot, nor the literature that follows DeGroot (see for example Press (1978) and Berger (1981)) seem to
be aware of this previous work. As with French and Harary, none of this work considers the economic context
of maximizing behavior nor the application to ¯nancial markets which we pursue.
8See also Kandel and Pearson (1992) and Hindy (1994) for models where traders have di®erent models of
the world. Similarly, Beltratti and Kurz (1996) and Garmaise (1997) consider trade in a setting where agents
must obey rational beliefs rather than the stronger notion of rational expectations, e®ectively allowing agents
to believe any model not contradictable by the data.
6own information is far from complete, and seek out the information of others. Our traders
can be interpreted to be mistaken about the representativeness of the information that they
obtain from others. This focus on the consequences of communication and updating more
naturally allows us to explore in°uence and the evolution of mistakes over time. In much of
the related literature, mistakes clearly cost traders wealth or utility, and hence are unlikely
to be evolutionarily persistent.9
One recent literature which does focus on the evolution of beliefs given repeated interac-
tions between agents is the large literature on social learning. Work in this area assumes that
agents choose actions over time, and base their choice on information received from other
agents. The choice of action can be in a non-strategic context, where an agent's action does
not directly a®ect other agents (for instance, agents are consumers who decide which product
to buy), or in a strategic context, where agents play a game with other agents. Agents may
observe information from the whole population, or there may be \local interactions", where
agents only observe their neighbors. See, for example, Ellison (1993) and Fudenberg and
Ellison (1995) for local interactions in a strategic and non-strategic context, respectively, and
Bala and Goyal (1998) for a general neighborhood structure. Although there is a formal
similarity between this paper and the literature on social learning, the questions asked are
quite di®erent. The social learning literature studies whether agents adopt the optimal action
(in a non-strategic context) or converge to a Nash equilibrium (in a strategic context). By
contrast, this paper studies how in°uential each agent is in a®ecting the long-run limit of
others' beliefs, and how in°uence matters in a ¯nancial market setting.
2 The Dynamics of Beliefs Under Persuasion
2.1 Representing Beliefs
In developing a formal model of persuasion, one di±culty involves choosing a convenient
representation for an agent's beliefs. In general, if there is some unknown parameter µ of
interest, an agent i's beliefs at time t correspond to a probability distribution Ft
i for this
parameter.
The di±culty with this most general formulation is two-fold. First, when modeling the
communication between agents, it is unrealistically complicated for the agents to commu-
9An exception is De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990), which presents a model where traders
making a mistake do make money over time. In this model, some traders underestimate the variance of a
risky asset, and therefore over-invest in these assets. But since risky assets have higher expected returns, this
leads to higher expected wealth, even though actual utility is lower.
7nicate entire in¯nite-dimensional distribution functions. Any natural communication must
involve the reduction to a low dimensional vector. The second di±culty comes from the
aggregation of beliefs. Given agent i's own beliefs Ft
i and the information from agent j, Ft
j,
how should agent i aggregate this information when forming his new beliefs Ft+1
i ? Even if
we assume agents are Bayesian, this updating is complicated and non-linear in general.
We introduce two di®erent frameworks that allow us to simplify the problem of repre-
senting and updating beliefs. The ¯rst and most straightforward approach is to assume that
the underlying parameter µ and all available information sources have a joint normal distri-
bution. Under this parameterization, it is reasonable to think that agents communicate their
beliefs using a simple su±cient statistic of the information they have acquired. Moreover,
these su±cient statistics can be combined via a simple weighted average. This normal/linear
framework is convenient, and we shall pursue it more detail in Section 3 when we imbed our
model of persuasion within a standard noisy rational expectations model of asset markets.
The normal/linear framework, while simple, is of course a very special case. We would like
to build a model of persuasion that does not rely on such strong distributional assumptions
in order not to restrict its applicability. This is possible if instead of representing the beliefs
directly through posterior distribution functions, we represent them indirectly through the
data which generates those beliefs.
In particular, suppose that individuals learn about the unknown parameter µ by gathering
\evidence" or \experimental" data. That is, each agent observes the outcomes from n iden-
tical experiments. Each observation can take on k possible realizations, with the likelihood
of observing any particular outcome in the set depends upon the parameter µ. Further-
more, assume the joint distribution of the experimental outcomes (given µ) does not depend
on the order that the outcomes are observed. Then the data from the experiments can be





xi = 1; (2)
where xi represents the observed frequency of each outcome. Given this empirical distribu-
tion, agents then use their priors and Bayes rule to determine their posterior distribution for
the unknown parameter µ.
This formulation has the advantage that the empirical frequency x acts as a su±cient
statistic for an agent's posterior beliefs, and is much easier to communicate. It ¯ts directly
the situation of scientists sharing experimental data (or individuals sharing anecdotes about,
for example, the e±cacy of some home cold remedy). It also has the advantage of a simple,
linear aggregation rule. For example, if individuals i and j have each observed (directly
8or indirectly) the results of nt experiments at time t, and these experiments have outcome
frequencies xt
i and xt











In what follows, we develop a model of communication and in°uence consistent with these
two alternative representations of beliefs. That is, we model the beliefs held by an agent
by a ¯nite-dimensional vector, and suppose agents aggregate beliefs using a linear updating
rule. While justifying this representation by presuming joint normality is convenient for many
economic applications, the second approach based on communicating data makes clear that
this representation is not a distributional restriction.
2.2 The Basic Model
Consider a setting with N \types" of agents, N = f1;2;:::;Ng. For each type, there is a
continuum of individuals uniformly distributed over the interval [0;1]. We will denote an
agent m of type i by im, and the \position" of this agent at time t by xt
im.10 An agent's
position can be thought to represent his \beliefs" at a given time and is given by a point in
<p, where p is some constant. An agent begins at time 0 with beliefs x0
im and updates beliefs
in a manner to be described presently. We will let xt
i represent the average beliefs for agents







and x the vector (x1;x2;:::;xN)0. We will focus on the average beliefs of each type, and in
fact often refer to the \beliefs of type i" as though there were only a single agent of type i
with beliefs xt
i. In fact, the results of this Section can be stated in a setting in which there
is only a single agent of each type. We introduce a continuum because we shall develop a
competitive asset market model in Section 3.
We de¯ne a listening structure by a function S which maps from types in N into subsets
of N. The subset S(i) of N is interpreted as the set of types which type i listens to. We will
generally assume that i 2 S(i), i.e., that types listen to their own type, among others. We
will presume that each period, an agent of type i listens to the beliefs of one agent, randomly
drawn from the set of agents whose types are in S(i).11 The probability that an agent of
10When time is clear, we will often drop the superscript.
11In an earlier draft of this paper, we instead modeled agent i as listening to one agent of each type in S(i)
every period. In this alternative setting, the results in this section go through unchanged. In fact, convergence
within groups follows in a much simpler manner { by the law of large numbers { since all agents of a given
9type i listens to an agent of type j in any period is given by Tij, where Tij > 0 if j 2 S(i)




In most examples, we will assume uniform listening, so that Tij = 1=#S(i) for j 2 S(i). Our
results do not depend on this, and we can allow for non-uniform randomization to capture
that notion that some types may be more likely to encounter each other than other types.
The matrix T summarizes the communication structure of the model.12






















Note that S can also be depicted as a directed graph over N. The directed graph implied
by this listening structure is depicted in ¯gure 1, with an arrow from i to j indicating that
i 2 S(j) and hence i \in°uences" j.
After listening to the agent he has been randomly matched with, each agent updates
his beliefs accordingly. We do not address incentives for accurate reporting here { rather we
presume throughout that reports are conveyed accurately, and can be veri¯ed. Note, however,
that since agents are in¯nitesimal in this model, strictly speaking there is no incentive for
agents to misreport their beliefs.13
In line with our notion of persuasion discussed in the introduction, an agent im updates
as if the agents of S(i) comprise all agents in the world, and does not take into account the
presence of agents outside of S(i). Note that this does not imply that these other agents will
not ultimately a®ect the beliefs of an agent of type i; indeed, if agents of type i listen to
agents of type j but not those of type k, but agents of type j do listen to those of type k,
type now deterministically sample from the same types each period. We instead adopt the assumption in the
text because it captures the natural notion that individuals listen to the same number of other individuals
irrespective of type (instead of those types whose set S(i) is larger being able to undertake more sampling),
and this in turn greatly simpli¯es the analysis in our asset pricing model of Section 3.
12For the case of a single, atomistic agent of each type, the listening process must follow our alternative
speci¯cation (as discussed in footnote 11 above), whereby agent i listens to all agents in S(i) each period. The
weights Tij can then be interpreted as re°ecting di®erences in the weight the agent puts on the opinions of
others in S(i). The results developed here in the continuum case extend to the atomistic case.
13We will ¯nd in our asset market model that agents bene¯t from being in°uential. Therefore, even if
reports are not veri¯able and agents not in¯nitesimal, agents would have some incentive to report their
beliefs truthfully, insofar as accurate reports are more likely to lead to bene¯cial in°uence. Banerjee and
Somanathan (1997) consider a process which could be interpreted as persuasion, where the primary focus is
on agents' incentives to reveal their information when it is costly to do so.
10the beliefs of the type k agents will indeed a®ect type i, through their e®ect on j.
Speci¯cally, in this Section we assume that in period t, an agent updates his beliefs by
giving weight ¸t to the beliefs of the agent he listens to, and weight 1¡¸t to his own beliefs.
For ¸ = 1=2 this corresponds to the updating rule in equation 3. We allow for ¸ 6= 1=2 in
order to explore the sensitivity of our results to the agents' beliefs about their own precision
relative to others.14
In Section 3 we will show that this rule results in correct Bayesian inferences under a
particular (potentially misspeci¯ed) model of the world. For now, we will simply resort to
the two intuitive rationalizations of the introduction: either agents don't fully understand
the extent to which the views they listen to are not representative, or agents (sometimes
inaccurately) assess some individuals as possessing worthless information not worth listening
to. We will also show that if agents do in fact listen to representative samples, then ultimate
beliefs will correctly aggregate the available information.
De¯ning T(¸) to be the matrix T(¸) ´ ((1¡ ¸)I +¸T), our updating rule implies that
average beliefs for types obey the following process:
xt = T(¸t)xt¡1; t = 1;2;::: ; (5)






x0; t = 1;2;::: : (6)
Equation (6) describes the evolution for the average belief xi of each type i. At any point
in time, however, agents of a given type will have heterogeneous beliefs. These di®erences
exist due to the heterogeneity of their initial beliefs, together with randomness of the listening
process as agents interact each period.
In general, the dynamics of beliefs may be quite complicated. However, as we now show,
there will in general exist aggregate statistics of the beliefs which remain stationary over
time. In particular, suppose w0 = (w1;:::;wn) is such that
w0T = w0: (7)
That is, suppose w0 is a row eigenvector of T with eigenvalue 1. Then it follows that for all
14For example, if agents believe that only they are updating over time, then ¸t = 1
t+1 would be an appro-
priate rule.






x0 = w0x0: (8)
Note also that since the rows of T sum to 1, T can be interpreted as a stochastic matrix
de¯ning a ¯nite Markov chain. Any stationary distribution of this Markov chain will satisfy
(7). Thus, we can restrict w to be non-negative and sum to 1. Since a ¯nite Markov chain
has a stationary distribution, we have:15
Theorem 1 For any listening structure, there exist weights w corresponding to a stationary
distribution of T such that the weighted average of population beliefs is stationary over time.
That is, w0xt = w0x0 for all t.
This result implies immediately that if individual beliefs converge, they must converge to
w0x0. In the next Section we explore the conditions that are su±cient for such convergence.
2.3 Belief Dynamics with Strongly Connected Types
We now turn to questions regarding the convergence of beliefs in the population. As we
remarked earlier, there are two distinct sources of heterogeneity of beliefs. There is the het-
erogeneity of initial beliefs, together with the heterogeneity introduced over time through
the random listening process. Intuitively, though, the communication process should bring
agents' beliefs closer together, and the random listening process should diminish in impor-
tance over time. We will show that this intuition is correct provided that agents are not
isolated but are linked to each other through the listening structure, and that they put
su±cient weight ¸t on the beliefs of others.
The following de¯nitions will be useful:
De¯nition 1 We say type i is linked to type j, if there exists a sequence of types k1;k2;:::;kr 2
N such that, k1 2 S(i); k2 2 S(k1);:::;kr 2 S(kr¡1); j 2 S(kr).
De¯nition 2 We call a subset of types I ½ N strongly connected if 8i;j 2 I, i is linked to j.
15While we use the theory of Markov chains here and elsewhere in our analysis, we remark that the dynamic
process of beliefs in our model does not follow a ¯nite Markov chain de¯ned by the matrix T. We are post-
multiplying T(¸) by the actual beliefs, rather than pre-multiplying it by a distribution. Indeed, the process
followed by beliefs cannot be described as a ¯nite Markov chain. To describe it as a Markov process would
require an in¯nite-dimensional state variable representing the distribution of population beliefs.
12Recall that T is a stochastic matrix de¯ning a ¯nite Markov chain. It is immediate that
this chain is irreducible since N is strongly connected, and aperiodic since the diagonal of T
is strictly positive. It is well known that a ¯nite, irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain has a
unique stationary distribution w0 = (w1;w2;:::;wn), with wi > 0 for all i (see, for example,
Theorem 8.8 in Billingsley (1986)).
The ¯nal condition we need for convergence is that the cumulative weight that agents
put on the opinions of others is large enough, while at the same time they do not completely
ignore their own prior beliefs. This is captured by the following:
Assumption 1
P1
t=1¸t = 1; and there exists ¹ ¸ < 1 such that for all t, 0 · ¸t · ¹ ¸ < 1.
We then have the following convergence result:
Theorem 2 Suppose N is strongly connected, and Assumption 1 holds. Then for any initial








where w is the unique stationary distribution of T.16 17
Thus, provided the weight ¸t that agents put on others beliefs does not fall too quickly,
in the limit all agents will converge to the belief equal to a weighted average of the initial
population beliefs, with the weights given by the stationary distribution w.18 The individual
weights wi can be interpreted as the in°uence that each type i exerts on the outcome through
its members' initial beliefs. For the listening structure given above in example 1 and ¯gure
1, these stationary weights are given by w = (3
9; 2
9; 4
9). It is not surprising that the initial
average belief of type 3 in this example has the most in°uence on the ¯nal outcome, insofar
as all types listen to type 3, while only two of the three types listen to each of types 1 and
2. What, however, is striking is that type 1 has more weight on the ¯nal outcome than type
2. This is because while type 1 is listened to by the in°uential type 3 (and type 1 itself),
type 2 is only listened to by the less in°uential type 1 (and by type 2 itself). This example
16The statement regarding the beliefs of individual im apply almost everywhere.
17All proofs omitted from the text are in the Appendix.
18Intuitively, placing more weight on one's priors (decreasing ¸) slows down the process of convergence,
but doesn't a®ect the ultimate point to which the process converges, provided that T eventually gets in¯nite
weight. This result implies that even when the weight ¸(t) put on the new period t observation is proportional
to 1
t, beliefs still converge to w
0x
0. In many settings, such as the model of Section 3, ¸ = 1=2 and the condition
is obviously satis¯ed.
13demonstrates that in°uence in our setting derives not only from being listened to by many
types, but also from being listened to by in°uential types, where in°uence is determined
endogenously. (We will later formalize this intuition in Theorem 3.) To further the notion
that both the number and the in°uence of those who listens to a type determine this type's
own in°uence, consider the following, more complex example.
Example 2 Let N = 4, and let S(1) = f1;2;3g; S(2) = f2;3;4g; S(3) = f3;4g; S(4) =
f1;4g with uniform listening. The directed graph implied by this listening structure is de-
picted in ¯gure 2. Note that types 3 and 4 are both listened to by two other types, so
we would expect them to be more in°uential. However, type 4 is listened to by 3 directly,
so we would expect 4 to be more in°uential than 3. Finally, since 4 listens to 1, 1 should
be more in°uential than 2. In fact, the in°uence weights for this example are given by





Given Theorem 2, it is straightforward to show that if agents do listen to representative
samples and S(i) = N for all i, then the in°uence weight of every type is equal. Thus,
beliefs converge to a simple average of the information available in the population. In fact,
this result can be generalized as shown below to include any \symmetric" listening structure.
Thus, in°uence can be seen as emerging from asymmetries in the listening structure.
Corollary 1 Suppose that each type of agent listens to the same number of types, and also











Thus, if the listening structure is symmetric and if each type starts with information of
\equal quality," the heuristic updating rule speci¯ed here leads agents to correctly aggregate
information in the limit.19
Theorem 2 gives us one manner to characterize the weights that determine the beliefs that
all agents willconverge to whenN is strongly connected{ i.e., the stationary distributionof T.
We now show that in the special case of uniform listening, these weights can be characterized
in two additional manners, using trees derived from the directed graph representation of the
listening structure.
19The notion of equal quality depends on the setting. It would be satis¯ed, for example, if as in Section
2.1 agents begin by observing data from equivalent experiments, and share frequency information regarding
outcomes. In the normal/linear framework it would be satis¯ed if initial beliefs equal µ +²i +´im, were ² are
i.i.d., ´ are i.i.d., and all variables are joint normal.
14In particular, a tree is a directed graph connecting all members of N, where every type in
N save for one has a unique predecessor, there are no cycles, and one type (the root) has no
predecessors. We will call a tree admissible to the listening structure S, if for every type i save
for the type at the root of the tree, S(i) contains the predecessor to i in the tree. In other
words, trees are admissible if all branches directed from the root conform to the listening
structure. We de¯ne gi as the number of admissible trees for which i is the root. Intuitively,
gi gives the number of \routes" by which i in°uences others given listening structure S. In
accord with the literature, we will refer to gi as the number of i-trees de¯ned by S, and to
g0 = (g1;g2;:::;gN) as the tree-count de¯ned by S. Figure 3 gives the i-trees associated with
the simple listening structure of example 1. There is one 1-tree, one 2-tree, and two 3-trees.
We can now state the following theorem which gives two additional interesting character-
izations of the in°uence weights w.
Theorem 3 Let N be strongly connected, under the listening structure S, with associated
tree-count g. Let ±ij = 1 if j 2 S(i) and 0 otherwise. Then under uniform listening, the
in°uence weights w, which are given by the stationary distribution for T, can be characterized








Theorem 3 gives two rather striking additional characterizations of w, which follow from
Theorem 2 and the characterization of a stationary distribution of a Markov chain given
by Freidlin and Wentzell (1984). The ¯rst states that wi is proportional to the sum of the
number of j-trees for all j who listen to i. This makes precise the earlier notion that the
in°uence of a type can be characterized by the sum of a measure of in°uence of all types who
listen to this type. The theorem also states that this is equivalent to the number of types
who i listens to multiplied by gi. Note that we have placed no restrictions on the relationship
between ±ij and ±ji; that is, there is no connection between who i listens to and who listens
to i. Nonetheless, these two expressions are equivalent, and both are proportional to w due
to the manner in which trees are counted.
Example 3 Consider once again the listening structure S given in example 1. As noted
above, admissible trees are shown in ¯gure 3 and g = (1;1;2). Theorem 3 gives us two
manners to calculate weights w. Under the ¯rst method, the sum of the tree count over
those who listen to each type is: 4 for type 3 (type 3 is listened to by all three types), 3 for
type 1 (type 1 is listened to by types 1 and 3) and 2 for type 2 (type 2 is listened to by types
151 and 2). Normalizing, we obtain w = (3
9; 2
9; 4
9). Employing instead the second method, we
multiply gi by the number of types i listens to, yielding (3,2,4), and normalizing once again
gives w.
2.4 A General Characterization
So far we have only considered belief convergence when N is strongly connected. We now
consider more general listening structures, though we maintain Assumption 1 throughout
this section.
First we will de¯ne a useful partition of types based on the relationship of strong connect-
edness. In particular, consider the relationship of strong connectedness, de¯ned by iCj if i is
linked to j and j is linked to i. The relationship C is re°exive, symmetric and transitive, and
therefore de¯nes an equivalence class over types which is uniquely represented by a partition
which we denote I. By this construction, it is immediate both that for any I 2 I, I is
strongly connected, and furthermore, that any strongly connected collection of types must
belong to some element I 2 I.
Consider an element I of the partition I. Let x0(I) be the vector x0 restricted to the set
of agents belonging to I, and w(I) be the stationary distribution corresponding to partition
element I when S is restricted to I. If no element of I listens to any type j 62 I, then the
evolution of beliefs within I can be considered in isolation, and the results of the preceding
Section apply. This motivates the following de¯nition and Theorem.
De¯nition 3 A subset of types I is isolated if for all i 2 I, S(i) ½ I.
Theorem 4 Suppose I 2 I is isolated. Then the beliefs of all agents in I converge to
w(I)0x0(I).
Thus, the isolated members of I can be treated independently. On the other hand, if
I 2 I is not isolated, the beliefs of its members will be in°uenced by the beliefs of types not
in I. To identify the set of types that might in°uence I, we de¯ne the following.
De¯nition 4 For any I;J 2 I, we say that I is linked to J if there exists i 2 I that is linked
to j 2 J.
For any general listening structure with strong connections de¯ned by the partition I,
de¯ne J to be the collection of isolated members of I. We then have the following charac-
terization for J and for the convergence of beliefs of all types.
16Theorem 5 The collection J of isolated members of I is nonempty, and each non-isolated
member of I is linked to at least one isolated member. Furthermore,
1. For all J 2 J, the beliefs of all agents in J converge to w(J)0x0(J).
2. If I 2 InJ is linked to a unique J 2 J, then the beliefs of all agents in I converge to
w(J)0x0(J).
3. For all I 2 InJ, the beliefs of each type in I converge to a point in the interior of the
convex hull (under the subspace topology) of the beliefs w(J)0x0(J), for all J such that
J 2 J and I linked to J.20
If i and i0 are two types in a non-isolated set I 2 I, it is possible in general for them to
converge to di®erent ¯nal beliefs, as shown in the following example.
Example 4 Let N = 5, and S(1) = (1;2;3); S(2) = (1;2;4); S(3) = (3); S(4) = S(5) =
(4;5). Then I = ff1;2g;f3g;f4;5gg. The isolated members of I are J = ff3g;f4;5gg.
With uniform listening, Theorem 5 indicates that the beliefs of type 3 converge to x0
3, and
the beliefs of types 4 and 5 converge to (x0
4 + x0
5)=2. Furthermore, for the non-isolated
set f1;2g, beliefs do not converge to the same point. Instead, the average beliefs of type
1 converge to (2=3)x0
3 + (1=6)x0
4 + (1=6)x0





We remark that in case 3 of Theorem 5, individual beliefs do not necessarily converge,
though the (average) beliefs of each type do. To see why, consider the case in the previous
example. Each period, some agents of type 1 will listen to agents of type 3, others will listen
to agents of type 4, etc. Thus, there will exist a steady-state stationary distribution of the
beliefs of the individual agents within types 1 and 2. This can be solved for numerically (in
fact it is rather complex), and is illustrated in Figure 4.21
Before ending Section 2, we should note that while we have provided convergence results,
we have not characterized the rate of convergence. For some listening structures, however, the
rate of convergence may be more relevant than the convergent beliefs. Consider for example
20That is, if the convex hull is p-dimensional, beliefs converge to the interior of the convex hull in this p
dimensional space. If I is only linked to a single member J 2 J, then beliefs converge to the point where the
beliefs of types in J converge, which is the \interior" of this point in the subspace topology de¯ned by this
one point.
21Note that this non-convergence of individual beliefs is an artifact of the way we have speci¯ed the listening
process. If agents instead listened to one agent of each type in their listening each period as discussed in
footnote 11 above, all agents' beliefs would converge to the average.
17a listening structure where all types save for one (the \hermit") are strongly connected and
share many links, and the hermit listens only to himself, and is listened to by one other type.
Our convergence results yield the rather counterintuitive outcome that the hermit will, in
the limit, completely determine everyone's beliefs. However, if the other types communicate
enough, they could all e®ectively converge to the same beliefs long before the hermit has any
signi¯cant in°uence. If the outcome is realized between the time it takes for other types to
converge and the time it takes for the hermit to in°uence beliefs, beliefs will be as if the
hermit is not connected.
3 Persuasion and Asset Markets
In this Section we incorporate our model of persuasion into a model of asset markets. There
are two reasons we believe this to be a natural and interesting application. First, most models
of asset markets generate trading volume either through allocational motives, such as risk-
sharing and liquidity, or through informational motives, such as private information about
asset payo®s. In actuality, however, much trading volume seems to be generated because
agents believe that they can process the same, public information better than others. Indeed,
most speculative traders do not appear to have any source of private information regarding
asset payo®s. Rather, they seem to make trading decisions based on media accounts, tips
from friends, advice from analysts and market \experts," various data crunching or charting,
etc. These traders thus seem to believe that their method of processing public information
is better than that of the average trader. That is, they read the \right" media accounts, or
get tips from the \right" set of people, or employ the \right" data crunching techniques, etc.
Such notions readily correspond with our model of persuasion. Indeed, in our model, agents
believe that only a subset of the population possesses useful information worth listening to,
and that the beliefs of the remainder of the population consist of useless noise. Therefore,
agents believe that they are better than others in identifying the useful information in the
population.
Second, insofar as our model of persuasion endogenously characterizes in°uence as a
function of the listening structure, it seems like an obvious setting to examine common
questions relating to the role of in°uence in trading. We analyze to what extent in°uential
traders move prices and can bene¯t from doing so. This allows us to examine the trade-o®
between in°uence and accuracy. We examine both how in°uential traders perform relative
to accurate traders, i.e. traders who can accurately predict the asset payo®, and whether
it is more bene¯cial for other traders to listen to those who are in°uential or to those who
18are accurate. We also consider to what extent in°uence can be self-perpetuating. Intuitively,
when agents have di®ering equilibrium beliefs about expected payo®s,22 agents' trades will on
average be increasing in the di®erence between their beliefs and \average" population beliefs,
represented in prices. If agents also communicate over time, however, then their beliefs will
converge over time. Based on the model in Section 2, beliefs will converge towards beliefs that
put greater weight on those agents with higher in°uence, and so prices will on average move
towards the beliefs of in°uential agents. Thus, agents can pro¯t by listening to the in°uential
agents before their views are fully incorporated into prices. But if this leads agents to adjust
their listening sets to include these in°uential agents, this will serve to increase further the
in°uence of those agents. This positive feedback leads to \stable" listening structures in
which all agents listen to the same market \guru."
In Section 3.1 we present an asset market model where agents both listen to each other
and trade. In Section 3.2 we present behavioral rules, in line with our notion of persuasion,
that the agents use to update beliefs and trade. In Section 3.3 we demonstrate that these
behavioral rules can be rationalized as rational expectations equilibrium (REE) behavior
for fully rational individuals operating under a \slight" misspeci¯cation of the world. Such
a setting adds insight into our process of persuasion. In Section 3.4 we determine agents'
payo®s, and show that it is bene¯cial to listen to both in°uential and accurate agents. Finally,
in Section 3.5 we make the listening structure endogenous. We examine the trade-o® between
in°uence and accuracy, and obtain conditions under which in°uence is self-perpetuating.
3.1 The Asset Market Model
Agents can invest in a riskless and a risky asset. The rate of return on the riskless asset is





The ¯rst component, V , is a weighted sum of information coming from H \sources" such as
company reports, macroeconomic announcements, etc. The information coming from source
h is ²h and is weighted by vh. The ²h's are independent and normal with mean zero and
variance ¾2











² to 1.23 The second component of the asset's payo®, ³, is independent
22Agents' beliefs will generally di®er in equilibrium as long as agents do not believe prices are fully revealing.
23This is without loss of generality. We can ¯rst normalize ¾
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h to 1 by rescaling the shares of the asset.
19of the ²h's and normal with mean 0 and variance ¾2
³.
Initially, agents observe information from each of the H sources. Agent m of type i
observes a signal
sim;h = ²h + ´im;h (12)
from source h. The noise ´im;h is independent across sources and agents (and independent of
all other variables in the model), and is normal with mean 0 and variance ¾2
´.24
To explore the e®ects we are interested in requires that we allow for multiple opportunities
for both trade and communication. To keep the model as simple as possible, we allow for
two rounds of trade. Prior to each opportunity for trade, communication occurs. Thus, the
model can be described with four periods: at period 0, agents observe the signals. Between
periods 0 and 1 there is one round of communication. At period 1 agents trade. Between
periods 1 and 2 there are T ¡ 1 rounds of communication, where 2 · T · 1. At period 2
agents trade again. Finally, at period 3 the asset pays o® and agents consume.25
3.2 Behavioral Rules
In this Section we describe behavioral rules, in line with our notion of persuasion, that the
agents use to update beliefs and trade. In Section 3.3 we will describe a misspeci¯ed model
of the world under which the behavioral rules can be rationalized. At period 0 agents use
their signals to form an initial estimate of the asset's payo®. A su±cient statistic of agent
im's signals sim;h, is the weighted sum of these signals with weights vh. We assume that the





The weights vi;h depend on i, and are thus type-speci¯c. Since di®erent types use di®erent
weights, they interpret the same information di®erently, and trade on the basis of their
24We introduce the private, agent-speci¯c signals in order for agents to have di®erent information and
therefore a motive to communicate. It is important to note that the private signals are consistent with our
statement that, in this model, agents trade not because of private information but because they interpret
public information di®erently. Indeed, all agents have signals of the same quality, and understand this to
be the case. Therefore, the signals do not introduce in and of themselves any motive to trade. Rather,
di®erent types di®er on how they interpret these signals (see equation (13) below), and which other types'
interpretations they listen to.
25Ideally, one could consider many rounds of trade, with communication between each round. Fortunately,
the main intuitions emerge from this simpler setting. As we will see, what is critical is the total amount of
communication that occurs prior to the last round of trade. It is for this reason that we will consider the
e®ect of varying T.
20interpretations. We introduce type-speci¯c weights in order to allow for systematic di®erences
in beliefs across types and, in particular, for di®erences in accuracy.The more accurate types
use weights that are closer to the true weights. We assume that
PH
h=1v2
i;h is independent of
i and equal to 1, as for the true weights. We also assume that
PH
h=1vi;hvj;h is independent
of i and j, and denote it by ½. Finally, we use ½i to denote
PH
h=1vhvi;h. The parameter ½i
belongs to the set [¡1;1], and is close to 1 if type i's weights are close to the true weights.
Therefore, ½i is a measure of type i's accuracy.26
Communication and updating is as in Section 2. At each communication round, agent
im listens to one agent, randomly drawn from the set of agents whose types are in S(i). We
assume that agents communicate su±cient statistics of their information. We denote by st
im
the statistic of agent im at communication round t, and by st
i the average of st
im over agents
of type i. We refer to st
i as the statistic of type i at round t. The dynamics of st
i are given






















The intuition for this is the following. Initially, agent im forms his statistic sim. Averaging
over all agents of type i eliminates the idiosyncratic noise, ´im;h. At each subsequent round,
agent im learns the current statistic of an agent chosen at random from his listening set.
Since both agents' statistics are based on an equivalent amount of information (they have
each heard from the same number of other agents), they put equal weight on the two statistics.
Finally, the idiosyncratic risk of the listening process is again eliminated by averaging over
all agents of type i, so that we only need to consider the average statistic in S(i).





i;h is independent of i and
PH
h=1 vi;hvj;h is independent of i and j are for
tractability. These assumptions imply some symmetry across types. Our goal is to have types as symmetric
as possible, and di®ering only in their in°uence (measured by their weights in group beliefs) and accuracy
(measured by ½i). Symmetry across types simpli¯es the computation of agents' payo®s in Theorem 7. We
believe that our results would not be qualitatively altered if we allowed for less symmetry across types.





h=1 vi;hvj;h = ½,
and
PH

















N(1 + ½(N ¡ 1))
!
:




i;h = 1 and
PH
h=1 vi;hvj;h = ½. The
second condition ensures that there also exist weights vh such that
PH
h=1 vhvi;h = ½i. The second condition
bounds the dispersion in types' accuracies as a function of ½. If, for instance ½ = 1, all types must use the
same weights. Therefore, they must be equally accurate.
21the dynamics of st
i as











The dynamics of st
i are thus exactly as in Section 2. Denote by wt













and recall that the results of Section 2 imply that the weights wt
ij sum to 1 and that, when
types are strongly connected, wt
ij ! wj as t ! 1.
We assume that agents submit simple linear demand functions in each period. The

























for some constants A1, B1, A2, B2, and C2. The demand at period 1 depends on the agent's
period 1 statistic s1
i;m, and on the price. The demand at period 2 depends on the agent's
period 2 statistic sT
i;m, on the period 2 price, and on the period 1 price. Demand can depend
on the period 1 price, since the price can a®ect, together with the period 2 statistic, the period
2 beliefs.27 The market prices at periods 1 and 2 are obtained by aggregating demands. In








represent the average population statistic at round t, then market-clearing prices are given
by
p1 = A1s1 and p2 = A2sT +C2p1: (17)
The period 1 price is linear in the average statistic at round 1. The period 2 price is linear
in the average statistic at round T, and in the period 1 price. Plugging prices into demands,
we can ¯nd agents' positions in the risky asset. The positions of agent im at periods 1 and 2
27We assume linear demands because they are tractable and can be supported as part of an REE. However,
the key aspect of demands is that they are increasing in the agent's beliefs and decreasing in the price, and it



















respectively. The positions are linear in the di®erence between agent im's statistic and the
average statistic. Thus, individuals trade based on the di®erence between their beliefs and
average population beliefs.
We assume that C2 < 1 and A2 + C2A1 > A1. Using equation(17) that gives the prices
at periods 1 and 2, we can give a natural interpretation to these inequalities. The ¯rst
inequality implies that an increase in the round 1 average statistic, holding the round T
average statistic constant, has a greater impact on the period 1 than on the period 2 price.
The second inequality implies that an increase in both the round 1 and round T average
statistics, has a greater impact on the period 2 than on the period 1 price. In Section 3.3
we show that both inequalities are satis¯ed when demands are optimal under a misspeci¯ed
model of the world.
3.3 A Rationalization of the Behavioral Rules
In this Section we present a misspeci¯ed model of the world under which fully rational agents'
actions are given by the above behavioral rules. We are agnostic as to whether agents'
behavior as described in our model is likely to arise due to inaccurate updating (for example,
due to the psychological impact of persuasive activity), or due to accurate updating under
such a misspeci¯cation of the world. Rather, we present this setting here to demonstrate that
the behavior we examine could be attributed to a relatively slight misspeci¯cation agents have
of the world.
Suppose that agents have exponential utility functions over ¯nal wealth, and the following




vi;h²h + ³: (19)
Note that this is identical to the true model of equation (11), save for the fact that the
agent employs the type-speci¯c weights vi;h instead of the true weights vh. Second, the agent
assumes that the world is made of two sets of types, \smart" and \dumb." The smart types
are the types that he listens to, i.e. the types in S(i). The agent believes that these smart
types act exactly like he does. In particular, he believes that they assume that the asset's
payo® is given by equation (19), and that their listening set is S(i). Dumb types, on the other
23hand, are taken to behave like \noise traders." They are believed to supply inelastically u1
and u2 units of the asset at periods 1 and 2. The variables u1 and u2 are independent of each
other and of the other variables of the model. They are normal with mean 0 and standard
deviation #S(i)¾u1 and #S(i)¾u2, respectively.28 29
The ¯rst error in agents' model obviously rationalizes the use of the type-speci¯c weights
instead of the true weights, for forming the su±cient statistic at period 0. Intuitively, agents
may inaccurately assess the relative weight that should be placed on chartist information
versus industry information versus accounting information. The second error rationalizes the
communication and the agents' manner of updating their information. Recall that central to
our notion of persuasion is that agents only listen to some sources of information, and that
they do not accurately adjust for the biases in their sources. Under this assumption, such
behavior follows rationally. Agents only choose to listen to some types since they take others
to be noise. Furthermore, agents weigh their information equally with those that they listen
to, since they believe these agents behave exactly like themselves.30
The second error in agents' model also rationalizes the demands. Agents form demands
in accord with a standard noisy REE computed according to their model of the world. In this
equilibrium, smart agents submit demands that have the form of equations (15) and (16),
and the dumb agents behave like noise traders. Agents submit price-elastic demands, and
are thus willing to trade, since they assume that prices are partly driven by the noise traders.
In theorem 6 we show that agents' demands are consistent with REE.
Theorem 6 There exist coe±cients A1, B1, A2, B2, and C2, such that equations (15) and
28A criticism of the assumption that dumb types behave like noise traders, is that the agent's model of the
world becomes very di®erent from the true model. Indeed, the agent is not aware that dumb types receive
signals as per equation (12), and form beliefs by communicating with other types. An alternative assumption
that addresses this criticism, is the following. The agent believes that some sources of information are pure
noise, and gives them 0 weight. Moreover, he assumes that dumb types give positive weight only to these
sources of information, and communicate only with dumb types. (For instance, fundamentalists might believe
that chartists have access to the same sources of information that they have, but simply choose to base
their beliefs on the \misleading" chartist sources.) The two assumptions are not completely equivalent, since
the behavior of dumb types, and thus their e®ect on price, could be predicted by observing the sources of
information to which they give positive weight. Rather than pursue this complication, we adopt the assumption
that dumb types behave like noise traders for simplicity.
29We assume that the standard deviation of the noise is proportional to #S(i) for simplicity. It implies that
agents share the same \signal-to-noise" ratio for the economy, and hence the coe±cients A1, A2, B1, B2, and
C2, of the REE are the same across types. Intuitively, if #S(i) is large, type i believes that there are many
smart types. He must also believe that the noise is large, in order to compute the same e®ect of the noise on
the price as a type j with a small #S(j).
30It is worth reemphasizing that agents' listening sets may be determined by accessibility and transaction
costs as well as an assessment about quality. In a setting where some agents are inaccessible, an agent should
endeavor, over time, to place more weight on those who listen to sources that are not readily accessible, and
less on those who listen to familiar sources. The failure to correctly adjust weights in this manner when some
agents are inaccessible is another way to interpret our persuasion bias.
24(16) are equilibrium demands in a REE computed according to the agent's model. Moreover,
C2 < 1 and A2 +C2A1 > A1.
3.4 Agents' Payo®s
For simplicity we assume that agents start with zero positions in both the risky and the
riskless asset. The consumption of agent im is
y1(s1
im)(p2 ¡p1) +y2(sT
im)(V +³ ¡ p2):
The ¯rst term is the capital gain between periods 1 and 2, while the second term is the capital
gain between periods 2 and 3. Consumption is the sum of capital gains.
In theorem 7 we determine the expected consumption of agent im. We take expected
consumption as a measure of the agent's payo®, both in this Section and in Section 3.5.31 To









the \average" in°uence of type j over the population at communication round t. We denote









which measures type j's impact on type i's position at period 1. That is, i's position is
determined by the amount i is in°uenced by j relative to the average amount the population









which measures type j's impact on type i's position at period 2. We denote by P1 the vector
whose j'th component is A1w1
j: The j'th component of P1 measures type j's impact on the




31This is consistent with our emphasis on the behavioral rules as primitive. Under the rational interpretation
of the behavioral rules, however, one could also consider expected utility as a criterion. While we use expected
consumption for tractability, we can show that for ¾2
³ and T are large, the expected consumption and expected
utility criteria converge.
25which measures type j's impact on the period 2 price. Finally, we denote by R the vector
whose j'th component is ½j, i.e. the vector of types' accuracies. We then have the following
result.
Theorem 7 The expected payo® of agent im is
(1 ¡½)Y0
i;1(P2 ¡ P1) + Y0
i;2(R ¡(1 ¡½)P2): (20)
The agent's payo® decomposes neatly into two terms, that capture the bene¯ts of listening
to in°uential types and the bene¯ts of listening to accurate types respectively. The ¯rst term
corresponds to the capital gain between periods 1 and 2. This capital gain is large when the
agent listens more than the average agent to in°uential types. Indeed, suppose that agent im
listens to an in°uential type j. When j is optimistic, agent im will buy at period 1. Since j
is in°uential, he will \pull" the price towards his beliefs. Therefore, the period 2 price will
be higher than the period 1 price, and agent im will realize a capital gain. Formally, the j'th
component of the vector Yi;1 is positive (agent im buys when j is optimistic) since j has more
in°uence on type i than on the average type, and the j'th component of the vector P2¡P1 is
positive (the period 2 price is higher than the period 1 price) since j has more in°uence on the
period 2 beliefs than on the period 1 beliefs. The second term in equation (20) corresponds
to the capital gain between periods 2 and 3. This capital gain is large when the agent listens
to accurate types. Indeed, suppose that type j is accurate. When j's beliefs are optimistic,
if agent im listens to agent j, agent im will buy at period 2. Since j is accurate, the true V
will be high, and agent im will realize a capital gain. Formally, the j'th component of the
vector Yi;2 is positive and the j'th component of the vector R is large.
An interesting special case of theorem 7 is when there is an in¯nite number of communi-
cation rounds (T = 1) and all types converge to the same belief. Since all types converge
to the same belief, they all have a zero position in the risky asset at period 2, i.e. the vector
Yi;2 is equal to 0. The payo® of agent im consists only of the capital gain between periods
1 and 2, i.e. of the bene¯t of listening to in°uential types. Intuitively, there is no bene¯t of
listening to accurate types for the following reason. The information of the accurate types is
useful for establishing a position at period 2. However, at period 2 the accurate types have
been \in°uenced" by the in°uential types. Since the beliefs of all agents converge, listening
to an accurate type is no di®erent than listening to any other type at that stage. In fact, in
period 2 all agents hold identical portfolios (which are equal to zero in the case of zero net
26supply securities), independent of their initial accuracy, listening sets, or initial beliefs.
There is a bene¯t of listening to accurate types when there is a ¯nite number of communi-
cation rounds. With a ¯nite number of rounds, the accurate types are not \fully" in°uenced
by the in°uential types. Beliefs will not have yet converged, and consequently, those with
accurate models and those who listen to them will have, in expectation, more accurate valu-
ations. Consequently, when the truth is revealed, they will stand to gain from their period 2
position. Whether this bene¯t of listening to accurate types outweighs the bene¯t of listening
to in°uential types depends on the relative size of the two terms in equation (20).
Note that there could also be a bene¯t of listening to accurate types even with an in¯nite
number of updating rounds provided that all types are not strongly connected. In this case
beliefs of all types do not converge to the same point, and consequently, those whose beliefs
have converged to a more accurate assessment can bene¯t in second period trading with those
who have not.
3.5 Endogenous Listening Structure
In this Section we make the listening structure endogenous. We allow agents to change their
listening set, and de¯ne \stable" listening structures where agents do not want to change that
set. We next examine whether a particular class of listening structures, called \guru listening
structures" (GLS), are stable, and then study the full set of stable listening structures.
Finally, we derive the implications of our results for the persistence of in°uence and for the
trade-o® between in°uence and accuracy.
De¯nition 5 A stable listening structure S is such that the expected payo® of an agent does
not increase when the agent changes his listening set. The new set has to include the agent's
type.
We motivate this de¯nition by the following evolutionary story. Suppose that the asset
market model is repeated many times. An agent may question his assumption about who
are the smart types, and conduct an experiment. He may adopt a di®erent listening set and
compute his average consumption after a large number of repetitions. For a large number of
repetitions, average consumption is close to the agent's true payo®. If the listening structure
is not stable, some agents will adopt a di®erent listening set.
In theorem 8 we examine whether GLS are stable. In these listening structures, there is
a \guru type", say type i. Agents of the guru type listen only to their type, i.e. S(i) = fig.
Agents of other types listen to their type and the guru type, i.e. S(j) = fi;jg for j 6= i.































Furthermore, there exists a smallest T¤
i < 1 with the property that (21) holds for all T > T¤
i .
Also, if (21) holds for i, then (21) holds for all j such that ½j ¸ ½i.
For T = 1, any GLS is stable, independently of the accuracy of the guru. The intuition
is that when T = 1 there is no bene¯t of listening to accurate types. There is only a bene¯t
of listening to in°uential types, and the guru is the only in°uential type.
For ¯nite T, equation (21) may or may not be satis¯ed, depending on types' accuracies.
It is harder to satisfy when ½i is small and maxj6=i ½j large, that is, when the guru type is not
very accurate and the best non-guru type is very accurate. Intuitively, agents may drop the
guru type and listen to the best non-guru type. Equation (21) is also harder to satisfy when
minj6=i ½j is small, i.e. when the worst non-guru type is very inaccurate. To understand this
result, assume that an agent of the worst non-guru type decides to listen to the best non-guru
type, in addition to his type and the guru type. Since the cardinality of the agent's listening
set increases, the weight on his type will decrease. If the agent's type is very inaccurate, the
agent's payo® will increase.32
We next study the full set of stable listening structures for large T. In theorem 9 we
provide necessary conditions for a listening structure to be stable. These conditions are
generic in types' accuracies, i.e. they hold for all ½i except a set of measure 0.
Theorem 9 Generically in types' accuracies:
(i) For large but ¯nite T, only GLS listening structures can be stable.
(ii) For T = 1, any GLS is stable, but other stable structures are possible. Any stable
listening structures has the following properties: (a) there is a set I such that S(i) µ I for
i 2 I and S(i) = I [ fig for i = 2 I, (b) I is strongly connected, and (c) (P2 ¡ P1)i is
independent of i for i 2 I.
32Intuitively, if one's own type is not very accurate, it pays to associate with other more accurate types as
well as the guru type in part to reduce the amount of time spent talking to one's own type.
28For large but ¯nite T, all stable listening structures are GLS. To understand the intuition
for this result, we proceed in two steps. First, we show that we can rank types according
to the bene¯t of listening to them, which is a combination of their in°uence and accuracy.
Generically in types' accuracies, the ranking is strict. Thus we can without loss of generality
label the types 1;2;:::;N in order of decreasing bene¯t. An agent of type n listens to his
type, since he is constrained to, and to type 1. He may also listen to \intermediate" types,
between 1 and n, since this reduces the weight of his type. Therefore, for each n
S(n) = f1;2;:::;n0g[ fng for some n0 < n: (22)
To complete the proof it remains to show that n0 = 1 for all n. Suppose not; i.e. suppose that
some type other than type 2 also listens to type 2. We show that this implies that the bene¯t
of listening to type 2 must be less than the bene¯t of listening to type N, contradicting our
initial ordering. The reason for this is that for large T, the bene¯t of a type derives mostly
from the type's in°uence rather than its accuracy. This in°uence of a type can be measured
by the impact of the type's beliefs on the di®erence between the period 2 price and the period
1 price. Since type 2 is listened to by more types than type N, 2's beliefs have a larger impact
on the period 1 price. Moreover, the beliefs of both types have a very small impact on the
period 2 price, since beliefs converge to the beliefs of type 1. Thus, the in°uence of type
2 would be smaller than the in°uence of type N, a contradiction. Hence a stable structure
must be a GLS for large ¯nite T.
For T = 1, the stable con¯gurations can be characterized by a \guru set" I such that
agents listen only to their own type and types in this set. Second, the guru set is strongly
connected, and thus all types converge to the same belief. Third, all types in the guru set have
the same in°uence. Notice that GLS satisfy the necessary conditions, with I the singleton
that contains the guru. However, and in contrast to the case where T is ¯nite but large, larger
guru sets are possible. Such listening structures involve ties, i.e. the bene¯t of listening to all
types in I is the same. Ties are generic in types' accuracies, since accuracy does not matter
when T = 1 and all types converge to the same belief.
Theorems 8 and 9 imply that for large T, in°uence is self-perpetuating. Indeed, theorem 8
implies that for large T, GLS are stable, regardless of the guru's accuracy. Moreover, theorem
9 implies that for large but ¯nite T, GLS are the only stable listening structures. For T = 1
other listening structures can also be stable, but the necessary conditions are independent of
types' accuracies.33
33For general values of T, we are unable to determine the full set of stable listening structures. However,
using theorem 8,we can obtain some results on the trade-o® between in°uence and accuracy. First, as T
294 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed a model of social updating and communication meant to
capture a wide range of persuasive processes. In particular, our agents, cognizant that they
possess limited information, communicate with one another and update their beliefs accord-
ingly. Agents use plausible rules to update their beliefs, but do not give enough weight to
the views of agents they do not come into contact with.
Such an updating process admits several di®erent natural interpretations. Agents may end
up overweighting those they are in contact with in the manner prescribed in our model simply
because they do not consider the possibility that the views of those they listen to may not
be representative of all available information. Even if agents understand such views are not
necessarily representative, agents might not be able to undertake the complicated inference
and updating problem of trying to infer from their reports whom the agents that they listen
to are themselves listening to. Instead, upon hearing a similar opinion from two sources,
an agent simply counts this as two pieces of useful information without trying to determine
whether one of the sources was in°uenced (either directly or indirectly) by the other. Finally,
we can also give our process the interpretation (as we have in our ¯nance application) that
agents believe that only some fraction of other agents have useful information, and that not
all agents are correct about who has useful models of who does not.
Our view is that such biases are widespread, and re°ected in many processes and the
design of many institutions, ranging from debating procedures to court trials to marketing.
In perhaps every activity where agents are engaged in persuasive activity, they seem to care
greatly about the amount of contact they have with the targets of their persuasion. It is very
hard to rationalize this without some notion that repeated interaction, on average, a®ects
beliefs in predictable manners. Capturing this notion in as simple and natural a manner as
possible is the essence of our model.
An interesting question is whether such a persuasion bias in updating is due to a psy-
chological tendency for overweighting one's own experiences/peers/contacts/..., or whether
it can be rationalized from a more foundational behavioral setting, perhaps as a boundedly
rational response to information in an incomplete setting.34 For many day-to-day topics, an
agent's peer group may indeed contain of all individuals with useful information, or might
indeed be representative of the universe of information. Consequently, applying such an up-
becomes smaller, the number of stable GLS decreases. Second, as the number of stable GLS decreases, those
with less accurate guru types become unstable ¯rst.
34These two views, of course, need not be mutually exclusive.
30dating rule might often be quite rational. One could further imagine that it is likely to be
very taxing for an agent to try to discern in what settings their sources of information are
representative of all useful information and in what settings outside expertise beyond their
circles would be valuable, especially if the question at hand concerns a new topic that the
agent has little idea how to evaluate. Loosely speaking, an agent facing processing costs
might be best served by following a simple updating rule, and perhaps, over time changing
who she listens to based on the outcome. We are currently considering such a foundational
basis for our model.
While remaining somewhat agnostic about the source of our \persuasion bias"," we an-
alyze its consequences, both in a general setting and in an asset market setting. In general,
we analyze convergence of beliefs. Under the condition of strong connectedness, beliefs of all
agents converge to a weighted average of initial beliefs, where the weights associated with
each type of agent have a number of rather striking features. These weights, which are
readily interpreted as in°uence, follow both from characterizing the stationary distribution
of a Markov matrix that represents the listening structure, and from two di®erent manners
of \counting trees" which derive from the graphical nature of the listening structure. In-
tuitively, agents are in°uential if other in°uential agents listen to them, where in°uence is
de¯ned endogenously through the listening structure. In the asset market setting, we explore
the trade-o® between in°uence and accuracy. Our analysis indicates that listening structures
that do not necessarily aggregate information e±ciently can be \stable". For example, pro-
vided that su±cient updating occurs before more information on fundamentals is learned, it
can be in everyone's interests to listen to one market \guru" due to the fact that others are
listening to him, despite his being very inaccurate.
A few words on the testing of our model are probably in order. We readily acknowledge
that a satisfactory empirical test of the implications of our model is likely to be di±cult.
Our model yields a number of precise implications for beliefs and in°uence. However, these
predictions follow from the primitive of the listening structure. In most empirical settings,
information on the listening structure seems likely to be hard to come by, making satisfactory
empirical testing di±cult.
In contrast, however, we would argue that our model is very well suited for experimental
testing. Precise listening structures should be easy to create in an experimental setting. Our
model yields precise and unique implications for the propagation of beliefs in general, and
market trading in particular, as a function of this listening structure. Furthermore, our model
yields unique and precise predictions for how simple changes in the listening structure { such
as removing or adding a listening link { will impact the beliefs of an entire population. It
31is worth noting that the quantitative nature of our model's predictions go well beyond the
predictions of many behavioral models. Consequently, we believe that testing some of these
implications experimentally would be quite interesting and would provide for a strong test of
our framework. But perhaps this is because we have listened to one another too much, and
have therefore been unduly persuaded about the merits of our ideas.
32Appendix { Proofs
Proof to Theorem 2: We ¯rst show that (average) type beliefs converge to w0x0. It is
well-known that the matrix Tt converges to a limit T1 when t goes to 1, and that each
row of T1 is equal to w0 (see, for example, Theorem 8.8 in Billingsley (1986)). To show that
type beliefs converge to w0x0, we will show that the matrix
Qt
s=1T(¸s) converges to T1.
De¯ne the random variable ¤t to be equal to 1 with probability ¸t and 0 otherwise. Assume












By the Borel-Cantelli lemma, if
P1
t=1¸t = 1, then
Pr(¤t = 1 in¯nitely often) = Pr(
1 X
t=1
¤t = 1) = 1:






s=1 ¤s) = T1:
We next show that the beliefs of all agents converge to w0x0. We ¯x a time t1 and de¯ne
two processes for each agent im, both starting at t1. The ¯rst process is
²t









and the second is
yt












and thus the two processes are a decomposition of the agent's beliefs. The ¯rst process
describes the evolution of beliefs if at time t1 agents within a type have di®erent beliefs,
but (average) type beliefs are identical and equal to 0. The second process describes the
evolution of beliefs if at time t1 agents within a type have the same beliefs, which are equal
to the true type beliefs xt1. (Subsequent to t1, agents within a type will have di®erent
beliefs because they will randomly listen to di®erent types.) The ¯rst process represents the
\initial" heterogeneity, i.e. the within type heterogeneity induced from the heterogeneity at
t1. The second process represents the \random listening" heterogeneity, i.e. the within type
heterogeneity induced from random listening subsequent to t1.
33For z = ²;y;x, we denote by ¾t
zi the standard deviation of zt














We also denote by ¾t
z the maximum of ¾t




of the initial, random listening, and total within type heterogeneity at time t. Since the
processes ²t
im and yt










We ¯rst show that ¾t
² goes to 0 when t goes to 1. Equation (23) implies that
(¾t
²)2 · (1¡ ¸t)2(¾t¡1
² )2 + (¸t)2(¾t¡1
² )2 = (1 ¡2¸t(1 ¡¸t))(¾t¡1
² )2:
Therefore, ¾t




goes to 0, or its logarithm goes to ¡1. The logarithm is
t X
s=t1+1
log(1 ¡2¸s(1¡ ¸s)) · ¡2
t X
s=t1+1




and goes to ¡1.
We next show that by choosing t1 large enough, we can make ¾t









im are obtained by convex combinations of yt¡1
im , st









Since all types converge to w0x0, st
y and thus ¾t
y can be made arbitrarily small for t1 large
enough. Therefore, ¾t
x goes to 0 when t goes to 1. k
Proof to Corollary 1: The hypothesis implies #S(i) = n for all i and #S¡1(i) = m for all






















thereby showing that w is the stationary distribution of T. k
Proof to Theorem 3: First, suppose that for all i
P
j gj±ji = gi
P
j ±ij. Then to show that
34w is a stationary distribution, we need to show that for all j,
P
iwiTij = wj. Using the


















where we use the ¯rst de¯nition of wj and the fact that #S(i) =
P
j ±ij.
Thus it remains to show that
P
j gj±ji = gi
P
j ±ij.
For a given listening structure, consider the set Yi of all admissible trees with any root k
such that ±ki = 1. We can apply the following procedure to this tree:
Bi: If k = i, leave the tree unchanged. Otherwise, delete the link from i to its predecessor,
and add a link from the root to i. This creates an i-tree.
Next, starting with any i-tree, consider the following operation de¯ned for any j:
Aj: If j = i, leave the tree unchanged. Otherwise, there exists a k such that i immediately
succeeds k and j is in the subtree with root k (it is of course possible that j = k). Delete the
link from k to i, and add a link from i to j. Note that this yields a new tree with root k.
It is easy to verify the following: (1) if Aj(x) = y, then Bi(y) = x, and (2) if Bi(y) = x,
then Aj(x) = y for some j such that ±ij = 1.
By construction, #Yi =
P
j gj±ji. Alternatively, from the above we can construct Yi by
starting from each i-tree and applying Aj for each j such that ±ij = 1. Properties (1) and (2)
above guarantee that this construction is 1:1 and onto respectively. Hence, #Yi = gi
P
j ±ij,
proving the result. k
Proof to Theorem 4: Follows immediately by noting that if I is isolated, then types in I
only listen to one another, and therefore, theorem 2 applies directly to this subset of types.
k
Proof to Theorem 5: First we show that at least one element of I is isolated. Suppose
not. For any I;J 2 I, we say that I listens to J if there exists i 2 I, j 2 J such that
j 2 S(i). Consider the graph among members of I de¯ned by this listening structure. Since
by assumption, no element is isolated, it follows that each element of I listens to at least
one other element. However, since I contains a ¯nite number of elements, this implies at
least one cycle in the listening structure consisting of more than one element. But then all
types belonging to elements in this cycle are strongly connected, and therefore I is not the
partition de¯ned by strong connectedness. Hence, the subset J of isolated members of I is
nonempty.
Point 1 of the theorem follows immediately from theorem 4. To show point 2, we consider
a type i 2 I, and note that from point 3, i's beliefs converge to w(J)0x0(J). To show that
all agents in i converge to w(J)0x0(J), we proceed as in theorem 2. To show point 3, we
denote by x(i) the point to which beliefs of type i 2 I converge, L(i) the set of all types to
which type i is linked, I(i) ½ N the set of all types belonging to strongly connected isolated
sets to which type i is linked, and CH(S) ½ Rp the convex hull of any set of points S 2 Rp.
Abusing notation, we denote by x(J) the image under x of a set of types J. First note that
all types converge to a point in the interior of the convex hull of the convergent points of
those to whom they listen, since the vector of convergent beliefs x is given by Tx = x.
35We now claim that for any i, CH(x(I(i))) = CH(x(L(i))). CH(x(I(i))) µ CH(x(L(i)))
is immediate, since by de¯nition, I(i) µ L(i). Now suppose CH(x(I(i))) 6¶ CH(x(L(i))).
Then it must follow that there exists some type j 2 L(i) that converges to a point x that
is an extreme point of CH(x(L(i))) and is not in CH(x(I(i))). The type j 2 L(i) which
converges to this point j cannot belong to an isolated set, since he is not in I(i). Therefore,
he must listen to other types. But since all types converge to a point in the interior of the
convex hull of the convergent points of those to whom they listen, these types that j listens to
must all converge to x as well, or one of them must converge to a point outside CH(x(L(i))).
Both of these possibilities yield a contradiction. In particular, for the latter case, i is linked
to any type that j listens to, and therefore, any such type must converge to a point inside
CH(x(L(i))). For the former, any type that j listens to that converges to x as well must
in turn be linked to another new type that also converges to this point, since none of these
types can belong to an isolated set of types, by the reasoning above. And these types must
in turn be linked to other such types. But there are a ¯nite number of types, implying a
contradiction. Hence CH(x(I(i))) = CH(x(L(i))), and since i converges to a point in the
interior of CH(x(L(i))), we are done. k
Proof to Theorem 6: The equilibrium computed according to agent im's model is as follows.
















The demands of agent im are given by equations (15) and (16). The demands of any other
smart agent are given by the same equations, but for that agent's statistics rather than agent
im's. To show that prices and demands constitute a rational expectations equilibrium, we
need to show that demands are optimal given prices and that prices clear the market. We
¯rst show market-clearing. We next show that demands are optimal given prices, provided
that the constants A1;B1;A2;B2, and C2 satisfy a system of non-linear equations. We ¯nally
show that this system has a solution.
Market-Clearing
According to the model of agent im, the statistic of a smart agent at round t is equal to Vi
plus idiosyncratic noise, which is normal with variance ¾2
´=2t. Indeed, the initial statistic is
equal to Vi plus idiosyncratic noise, which is normal with variance ¾2
´. Moreover, the statistic
at round t is obtained by averaging two round t¡ 1 statistics.











This is because the average statistic of the smart agents is Vi, and the mass of smart agents
is #S(i). The demand of the dumb agents is ¡u1. The market thus clears if the price p1 is
given by equation (25). Market-clearing at period 2 follows similarly.
36Demands are Optimal Given Prices
We denote by y1 and y2 the ¯rst and second period positions of agent im in the risky
asset. Agent im's consumption is
y1(p2 ¡p1) +y2(Vi + ³ ¡ p2):
At period 2, agent im chooses his demand y2 to maximize






The optimal demand is
y2 =
E2(Vi) ¡p2
a(V ar2(Vi) + ¾2
³)
: (27)
The subscript 2 (1) in an expectation or variance means that these are conditional on in-
formation available at period 2 (1). This information consists of the round 0 statistic of
agent im, the round 0 statistics of the agents that agent im has listened to, both directly and
indirectly, and the period 1 and 2 prices. We denote by St(im) the set that includes agent im
and the agents he has listened to, both directly and indirectly, by round t. The cardinality
of St(im) is 2t. We denote by ¿´ the precision of the round 0 statistic of a smart agent, i.e.
¿´ = 1=¾2
´. Finally, we denote by ¿p1 and ¿p2 the precisions of B1u1=#S(i) and B2u2=#S(i),
respectively, i.e. ¿p1 = 1=(B1¾u1)2 and ¿p2 = 1=(B2¾u2)2. We have


















Using equation (28), and noting that
P
ST(im)sjm0=2T = sT
im, it is easy to check that the






















At period 1 agent im chooses his demand y1 to maximize












where the subscript 1 means that the expectation is conditional on information available at








We next substitute p2 and E2(Vi) from equations (25) and (28) respectively. Using equations



































We ¯nally separate the signals in S1(im) that the agent knows at period 1, and the signals



































The expectation in equation (32) has to be computed w.r.t. Vi, u2, and ´.













where x is a n£1 normal vector with mean 0 and variance-covariance matrix §2, I the n£n
identity matrix, b0 a number, b an n £1 vector, and C an n£ n symmetric matrix. We set
n = 2,





































Omitting the terms that do not depend on y1 and thus do not a®ect the optimization w.r.t.
y1, we can write equation (32) as





















































¿1 ´ Var1(Vi) = 1 + 2¿´ + ¿p1:
The agent chooses his demand y1 to maximize (34). The optimal demand is
y1 =





















Using equations (30), (31), and (36), it is easy to check that the demand (15) coincides with

























To show that C2 < 1 and A1 < A2 + C2A1 we use equations (30), (31), (38), and the fact
that k2 < 1.
The System has a Solution
Equations (29), (30), (31), (37), and (38), constitute a system of 5 non-linear equations in
the 5 unknowns A1, B1, A2, B2, and C2. The unknowns A1, A2, and C2 can be determined
39from B1 and B2 using equations (38), (30), and (31), respectively. To determine B1 and B2,











which is obtained by substituting A2 into equation (37). Using the de¯nitions of ¿p1, ¿p2, and




















The LHS is increasing in B2, goes to ¡1 when B2 goes to 0, and goes to 1 when B2 goes
to 1. Therefore, equation (29) has a unique solution B2(B1). B2(B1) is decreasing in B1,
is of order 1=B2
1 when B1 is small, and goes to a strictly positive limit when B1 goes to 1.
Consider now equation (39) where we replace B2 by B2(B1). It is easy to check that the RHS
is of order 1=B2
1 when B1 is small, and goes to a strictly positive limit when B1 goes to 1.
Therefore, equation (39) has a solution B1. k









im ¡sT)(V +³ ¡A2sT ¡C2A1s1): (40)








i ¡ sT)(V +³ ¡ A2sT ¡C2A1s1):













Taking expectations w.r.t. V and ³, and denoting by cov(V) the variance-covariance matrix




To obtain the theorem, we note that the elements of both yi;1 and yi;2 sum to 0, that all
diagonal elements of cov(V) are equal to 1, and that all non-diagonal elements are equal to
½. Therefore, y0
i;1cov(V) = (1 ¡ ½)y0
1 and y0
i;2cov(V) = (1 ¡½)y0
2. k
Proof to Theorem 8: We ¯rst assume a general listening structure, and compute agent
im's expected payo® when he adopts a listening set ~ S(i) instead of S(i). We next show that
the GLS with guru type 1 is stable, if and only if condition (21) holds.
Expected Payo®
The agent's consumption is given by equation (40). However, the expectations of s1
im
40and sT
im w.r.t. the idiosyncratic noise are no longer equal to s1
i and sT
i . To compute the
expectation of s1
im, we note that s1
im is the average of s0
im and s0
km0 for some agent km0 with













Notice that when ~ S(i) = S(i), this is equal to s1






















To compute the expectations w.r.t. V and ³, we proceed as in theorem 7. We denote by ~ yi;1





















































Proceeding as in theorem 7, expected payo® is
(1 ¡½)~ y0
i;1(p2 ¡p1) + ~ y0
i;2(R¡ (1 ¡ ½)p2): (41)
In equation (41), we will only consider the terms that depend on ~ S(i). To simplify these
terms, we introduce some notation. We denote by zk;1 the vector whose j'th component is
(1=B1)w0













Finally, we de¯ne bk by
bk = (1¡ ½)z0
k;1(p2 ¡p1) +z0
k;2(R¡(1 ¡½)p2): (42)
We can interpret bk as the bene¯t of listening to type k. Going back to equation (41), we






The bene¯t of adopting ~ S(i) as listening set, is thus the average bene¯t of listening to types
41in ~ S(i).
GLS is Stable





bi ¸ 0: (43)
Indeed, suppose that this condition holds. An agent of the guru type 1 does not want to







Condition (43) implies that b1 ¸ maxi6=1bi, therefore this inequality holds. An agent of a









If 1 2 I, we can write this condition as














Condition (43) implies that either inequality holds. To show that condition (43) is necessary,
assume that j is the non-guru type with the lowest bj, and that I = f1;ig where i is the
non-guru type with the highest bi.
We next compute the bi's and show that equations (43) and (21) are equivalent. The
in°uence weights as of round t are
wt
1;1 = 1; wt
1;j = 0; wt












































































for i 6= 1. Plugging p1 and p2 into b1 and bi, it is easy to check that equations (43) and (21)
are equivalent. Therefore, the GLS with guru type 1 is stable if (21) holds.




(A1 ¡ C2A1) ¸ 0;
and is satis¯ed with strict inequality since A2 > A1 ¡ C2A1 > 0. Therefore, by continuity
(21) is satis¯ed for large T. If ½j ¸ ½i, then maxk6=j ½k · maxk6=i½k, and
½j +min
k6=j
½k ¸ ½i +min
k6=i
½k:
(To show the last inequality we distinguish cases according to whether i has the minimum
accuracy among all types.) Therefore, if (21) holds for i, it holds for j. k
Proof to Theorem 9: We consider a stable con¯guration and show that it must be as in
the theorem. We ¯rst assume large but ¯nite T, and then T = 1.
Large But Finite T
We ¯rst show that, generically in types' accuracies, the bene¯ts bi, de¯ned by equation
(42), di®er across types. To show that bi 6= bj generically, it su±ces to show that zi;2 6= zj;2.
We will show that the i'th components of zi;2 and zj;2, denoted by fi(T) and fj(T), di®er.
Both fi(T) and fj(T) are linear combinations of exponentials in T. Since fi(1) = 1=B2 6=
fj(1) = 0, the coe±cients of the exponentials di®er. Therefore, fi(T) and fj(T) can be equal
only for T in a ¯nite set, and di®er for large T.
Since the bene¯ts bi di®er across types, we can use them to rank the types. Without
loss of generality, assume that type n is ranked n. To determine the listening set of type n,
we note that the average bene¯t of listening to types in this set, has to exceed the average
bene¯t for all other sets that include type n. Therefore, the listening set includes types 1, n,
and may include types 2 to n0 for n0 < n.
We next show that n0 = 1, i.e. that the listening structure is a GLS. We proceed by
contradiction and assume that for some n, n0 > 1, i.e. that type 2 is listened to by at least
one more type except himself. Since all beliefs converge to type 1's beliefs, wt
i;1 goes to 1,
and wt
ij for j 6= 1 goes to 0, as t goes to 1. Therefore, b2 goes to
(1 ¡½)(p2 ¡p1)2 + (R¡(1 ¡½)p2)1 = ¡(1 ¡ ½)(A1 ¡ C2A1)w1
2 + (R ¡(1¡ ½)p2)1;
43and bN goes to
(1 ¡ ½)(p2 ¡ p1)N + (R ¡(1¡ ½)p2)1 = ¡(1 ¡½)(A1 ¡C2A1)w1
N + (R¡(1 ¡½)p2)1;
We will show that w1
2 > w1
N. Using C2 < 1, we will conclude that for large T, b2 < bN, a




















































We proceed as for large but ¯nite T, and rank types according to the bene¯ts bi. We
denote by I the set of types with the highest bene¯t. (We consider sets because for T = 1
there can be ties.) The listening set of a type in I is a subset of I. The listening set of a type
not in I includes this type, all types in I, and may include some other types as well.
If types i;j 2 I converge to di®erent beliefs, then zi;2 6= zj;2. Therefore, generically in
types' accuracies, bi 6= bj, a contradiction. All types in I thus converge to the same belief,
which is a weighted average of their initial beliefs. Moreover, all types not in I converge to
that weighted average as well. We denote by wi the weight of type i 2 I, and by w the vector
whose i'th component is wi for i 2 I and 0 for i = 2 I. For T = 1, the vector zi;2 equals
(2=B2)w. Therefore,
bi = (1 ¡½)(p2 ¡p1)i +
2
B2
w0(R ¡(1¡ ½)p2): (44)
Using equation (44), and proceeding as in the case where T is ¯nite but large, we can show
that a type not in I listens only to himself and to the types in I. Equation (44) also implies
that (p2 ¡p1)i is independent of i for i 2 I.
To show that I is strongly connected, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that it is not.
Theorem 5 implies that I has a strongly connected isolated subset J. (Theorem 5 applies
with I instead of N since I is isolated.) Since all types in I converge to the same belief, this
belief is a weighted average of the initial beliefs of the types in J. Since
X
j2J





there exists a type j 2 J such that wj > w1
j. Using A2 > A1 ¡ C2A1, we have
(p2 ¡p1)j = A2wj ¡ (A1 ¡ C2A1)w1
j > 0:
44For a type i 2 InJ, we have
(p2 ¡p1)i = A2wi ¡(A1 ¡C2A1)w1
i = ¡(A1 ¡ C2A1)w1
i < 0:
This is a contradiction since (p2 ¡p1)i is independent of i for i 2 I. k
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